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The noted British historian Simon Schama has recently made a popular case for the power, utility 
and inspiration that history can provide Britain through its school system.
1
 Schama carefully 
insists that history is not a placebo for the arguments and ills that any given community may be 
plagued by, but neither will critical history allow a genealogy of self-congratulation. History is 
by definition a contested subject, he says, due to the nature of the practice in which historians 
participate. Schama lists several skills and benefits of this practice, which include: scrutinizing 
evidence and assessing credibility; analyzing the nature of power; understanding how societies 
acquire and loose wealth; and studying the nature of war, leadership, and authority. Citizens thus 
equipped are more likely to construct capacious histories where the narrow interests of any 
particular group will be dissolved in the larger, conflicted stories of the past. This is not some 
sentimental tale of political correctness, however, but a brutally practical education in tolerance. 
Nor will this kind of history be dead weight, Schama insists, but a source of inspiration over 
which participants can engage in lively and vital debate. And while this critical conversation will 
seldom be easy or smooth, it will preserve the fund of a “common memory”; in Schama‟s case 
this fund consists of six central events in Britain‟s past meant to give reflective pause in the face 
of the strong tensions that threaten to tear communities apart.  
Several years ago Mark Noll provided a somewhat similar account for evangelical Christians 
in his Turning Points: Decisive Moments in the History of Christianity.
2
 Like Schama, Noll uses 
a set of central events that he thinks shaped Christianity as a means of teaching Christians about 
their past. These short essays and the accompanying discussion questions emerged from teaching 
a course at church. What is the relationship that Noll sees between the teaching of history and the 
Christian community? According to Noll studying the history of Christianity “provides repeated, 
concrete demonstration concerning the irreducibly historical character of Christian faith.” It also 
provides a perspective on the interpretation of Christian scripture, a useful “laboratory for 
examining Christian interactions with surrounding culture”, confirming in a fairly clear way that 
“God sustains the church despite the church‟s own frequent efforts to betray its Saviour and its 
own high calling.”3 To this picture we should probably add that sketched by Noll in his more 
famous book, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind, where he identifies the anti-intellectual bias 
within evangelicalism as a historical aberration.
4
 Indeed, a significant part of Noll‟s attempt to 
recover a conception of faithful Christian life as one informed by and embodied in intellectual 
pursuit, is to recover and re-present a history of evangelicalism in which this becomes evident – 
as in the person of Jonathan Edwards, for example.  
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For Schama, then, history constitutes a critical practice through which it strives to continually 
produce better histories, a practice that informs and embodies good citizenship. And while this 
history will always be contested, continually open to revision, the very act of critical scholarship 
will preserve the means by which better histories can be made. This activity not only helps 
communities persevere, it helps them thrive – it promotes critical thinking, the construction of 
better arguments, and the cultivation of political virtues like tolerance without any attendant 
sanctimony. For Noll, Christians who understand their shared history will be more aware of its 
historical character, more aware of the context of Scriptural interpretation and its relation to a 
particular culture and context, and, ultimately, more aware of the fallibility of a community‟s 
ability to live faithfully in light of its sacred texts. At the same time, Noll insists that intellectual 
inquiry as practiced in Christian history has been and should remain a vital component of the 
faithful Christian life, collectively and individually. Both historians, then, seem to think that 
history does in fact have some important lessons to teach, broadly construed; and both historians 
suggest that there is a connection between the historian‟s practice and specific kinds of virtues, 
be they political or religious.  
It might be useful to take a step back here and consider how it is that we learn about history. 
When history is taught in a school – on a Sunday at church or on a Monday at public school – 
how is it taught? What happens when we pick up a book and read about the past? Or when we 
participate in a community in which a story of some kind – at a historical monument, say, or 
ceremony – is told? What we encounter are representations of the past in spoken or written 
discourse – be they analytical or narrative, fictional or historical, governed by standard 
discursive techniques and tropes. Insofar as both Schama and Noll fail to address the substance 
of history as representation, focusing as they do on practice, they fail to consider the relationship 
between the practice of history, the mediated representations fashioned by historians, and the 
more general historical condition of various communities, be they religious, political, or 
something else.  
In order to understand this relationship we can turn to the work of Paul Ricoeur, who has 
explored this at great length. According to Ricoeur historiography is a representation in that 
historical narrative is a species of symbolic discourse. In being a kind of discourse whose 
(narrative) form is wedded to its content (narrativization of events), historical narratives say 
more than what they say simply as narratives. As mediations they transmit a meaningful force 
that exceeds content and form alone. One of Ricoeur‟s central insights in Time and Narrative is 
that the “grasping together” of characters and events as actions performed in time is represented 
through a similar grasping together in narrative, which he called “emplotment,” following 
Aristotle‟s Poetics.5 In being figurative symbols historical narratives are more or less successful 
in revealing the meaning, coherence, or significance of events, while they simultaneously attest 
to the realism of events through their narration. And while historical narratives as representations 
differ from other narrative discourses in referring to a “real” human past, as opposed to an 
“imaginary” referent in the case of fiction, historiography is nonetheless governed by the same 
structured human imagination, which does not mean that historical narrative is any more or less 
77  Sheppard 
 
 
“true.” As Hayden White has asked in this context: “How else can any „past,‟ which is by 
definition comprised of events, processes, structures, and so forth that are considered to be no 
longer perceivable, be represented in either consciousness or discourse except in an „imaginary‟ 
way?”6  
White‟s question brings us back to the seemingly more practical concerns of Schama and 
Noll. If historical narrative is a symbolic discourse that “says more than it says”, who is it that 
perceives the surplus of meaning so generated? In Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur 
proposes that the reception of such meaning is given to the citizen, placed between the figures of 
the historian and the judge, without for a minute suggesting that any kind of absolute objectivity 
or infallible impartially is somehow possible. Rather the citizen emerges as a third partner 
between the historian who constructs and produces representations, and the judge who interprets 
and applies law in rendering a verdict. The citizen‟s “gaze” differs from these two figures in 
being “structured on the basis of personal experience, variously instructed by penal judgment and 
by published historical inquiry.” Placed between the historian and the judge, the citizen‟s 
interventions are never completed because continually contested, yet these interventions are 
based on the search for a quasi-final “assured judgment.”7 A similar imaginative setup can be 
easily enough constructed for the Christian believer, as a member of the religious community or 
ekklesia, who also intervenes, in this instance between the historian or exegete and the “judge” or 
religious practitioner (priest, pastor).  
In constructing representations of the past, Ricoeur argues that historians generate symbolic 
discourses that express an intention to metaphorically “stand for” the past. A historian thus 
creates a kind of discursive monument, like those historical monuments that come down to us 
from the past, as a “true” account. Ultimately it is up to the communities in which these 
representations are generated to determine the force of their meaning. And it is here that Ricoeur 
locates the interaction between the historian and the citizen – and we may again insert the 
believer (or a member of another community). For history not only expands the collective 
memory of a given community, it corrects, criticizes, and even refutes the memory of that 
community when “it folds back upon itself and encloses itself within its own sufferings to the 
point of rendering itself blind and deaf to the suffering of other communities. It is along the path 
of critical history that memory encounters the sense of justice.”8 Behind the historian‟s intention 
to truth is the attempt to uncover “the face of those who formerly existed, who acted and 
suffered, and who were keeping the promises they left unfulfilled.”9  
The realization of this attempt to understand and explain the past will of course be continually 
deferred, for no one will ever write the final historical account of anything. Rather, the 
realization of the historian‟s intent can only be taken up, Ricoeur suggests, in the community of 
readers in which the narrative has been fashioned. Here the community‟s intention to remain 
faithful to memory, be it national or religious or something else, comes up against the historian‟s 
intention to remain true to history and the judge‟s intention to render a just verdict. At this 
crossroad between history and memory and law, the citizen and the believer can actively 
reposition his or herself in the attempt to achieve a better vision or “gaze”, pursuing a sense of 
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justice. It is this power of repositioning, of achieving a new vision, a changed perspective or an 
enriched horizon, that Riceour most forcefully highlights by relating how historical narratives 
and common memory can remain in constructive dialogue. This power of repositioning is akin to 
the process of hermeneutic appropriation which aims at understanding. When we approach a text 
as readers we aim to understand it, we do not aim to project ourselves into the text but to receive 
an “enlarged self from the apprehension of proposed worlds” in the text itself. We “take up” the 
proposed world of meaning in a text just as we abide by the rule of a game we participate in; yet 
as in any played game, during the act of playing/reading a new experience emerges that is not 
coextensive with the subject playing the game or reading the text. In order to “take up” this 
experience we must simultaneously “let go”, submitting ourselves to the game and to the text.10 
If we transfer the work of appropriation in texts to that of historical representations, we can see 
that the stories generated by criticism can be appropriated by citizens and believers, expanding 
memory‟s horizon of meaning and thus resisting the “enclosure” to which it is sometimes prone. 
To Schama‟s account we can say with Ricoeur that critical history continues to generate the call 
of justice from other citizens and other communities by refusing the citizens of liberal 
democracies to allow memory to close itself off in an insular fashion. To Noll‟s account we can 
say with Ricoeur that critical history continues to elucidate the kerygma or proclamation of the 
Word in the “new testament” by refusing the believers and listeners of the Christian message to 
block up their ears with the voice of memory alone.
11
 While there is much more to be gleaned 
from Ricoeur‟s philosophy of history as a philosophy of both historicity (Geschichte) and history 
(Historie), we can at least look to his work here in order to better formulate the promise and the 
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